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I. Introduction
Suppose that a debtor stands to receive an amount of real or personal
property by will that he does not wish to use in satisfying his creditors.
Suppose also that the same debtor expects that he will soon have to file
bankruptcy. Should his creditors be able to take this family property even if the
debtor refuses to accept it under the will? Is it reasonable to allow creditors to
reach family property even though they did not inquire into the debtor's
expectations of receiving the property before extending credit?
Under common law, a debtor may disclaim devised property or, in other
words, refuse to accept it. Many jurisdictions apply the common law relation-
back doctrine, a legal fiction that title to the property never vested in the
disclaimant.' The relation-back doctrine causes the property to pass to other
relatives, as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent.2 As a practical
matter, the relation-back doctrine results in the debtor's children or siblings
receiving the property so that creditors cannot reach it.
Some states have curtailed the power of debtors to disclaim property to
avoid the claims of creditors.3 However, this Note focuses on whether state
laws permitting disclaimers conflict with federal bankruptcy law. It is relatively
clear that a disclaimer occurring after the debtor has filed bankruptcy is not
effective because the property has already become part of the bankruptcy
estate.4 The law is not so clear with regard to disclaimers occurring before the
I. See, e.g., Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556, 557 (Bankr. S.D. Il1.
1989) (explaining that a disclaimer, under Illinois law, relates back to the time of the devise, and
the property does not vest in the disclaiming party), affd, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991).
2. See id. (providing that a disclaimer causes an estate to descend as though the
disclaimant had predeceased the testator).
3. See, e.g., Pennington v. Bigham, 512 So. 2d 1344, 1347 (Ala. 1987) (finding a
disclaimer to be a fraudulent transfer of a property interest under Section 43-8-294 of the
Alabama Code); Stein v. Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ohio 1985) (holding a disclaimer to
be a fraudulent conveyance under Section 1339.60(B) of the Ohio Revised Code when the
beneficiary displays an actual intent to defraud present or future creditors); In re Reed's Estate,
566 P.2d 587, 591 (Wyo. 1977) (concluding that a disclaimer made with actual intent to hinder
a creditor amounts to a fraudulent conveyance under Section 34-144 of the Wyoming Statutes
Annotated).
4. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act:
Opportunities and Pitfalls, 28 EST. PLAN. 571, 576 n.38 (2001) ("If the beneficiary delays the
disclaimer until after a bankruptcy proceeding has begun ... it is more likely that the court will
determine the effectiveness of insolvent disclaimer under federal law."); see also Cornelius v.
Cornell (In re Cornell), 95 B.R. 219, 222 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (declaring that an interest
in the disclaimant's mother's estate vested in the debtors after they filed a bankruptcy petition
and thus the interest became property of the bankruptcy estate).
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debtor files for bankruptcy (prepetition disclaimers).5 The fraudulent transfer
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code empower a bankruptcy trustee to prohibit
the transfer of any "interest of the debtor in property" within one year prior to
filing for bankruptcy if the transferor possesses an "actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud" creditors or "received less than a reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for such transfer."6 Whether prepetition disclaimers are fraudulent
transfers largely depends on whether the disclaimed property was actually a
property interest of the debtor.7
In Drye v. United States,8 the Supreme Court held that a disclaimer does
not defeat a federal tax lien. 9 Since Drye, courts have disagreed as to whether
its holding should extend to disclaimers that frustrate creditors other than the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).'0 The Drye holding suggests that federal tax
law preempts state disclaimer law with respect to the existence and character of
a property right." Does this preemption mean that federal bankruptcy law also
should predominate over state disclaimer law with respect to the definition of
property interests?
5. See Gregory M. McCoskey, Death and Debtors: What Every Probate Lawyer Should
Know About Bankruptcy, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 669, 684-90 (2000) (expressing
uncertainty as to whether prepetition disclaimers are fraudulent transfers); Stephen E. Parker,
Can Debtors Disclaim Inheritances to the Detriment of Their Creditors?, 25 Loy. U. Cam. L.J.
31,40 (1993) (same).
6. II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2003).
7. See infra Part III.A (discussing whether a prepetition disclaimer constitutes a transfer
of any property interest of the debtor).
8. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999). In Drye, the Supreme Court considered
the interplay between state and federal law in defining property for the purposes of federal tax
law. Id. at 52. Rohn F. Drye Jr. owed the IRS $325,000 in unpaid taxes when his mother died
intestate, leaving him her entire estate valued at $233,000. Id. Months after she died, Drye
disclaimed his interest in his mother's estate, and the property passed to his daughter. Id. The
Court considered whether Drye's interest in the estate was a "right[ ] to property" under 26
U.S.C. § 632 I. ld. The Court determined that Drye had dominion over the property because his
disclaimer allowed him to channel the gift to a close family member. Id. at 60-61. The Court
held that Drye had a property interest subject to federal tax liens under 26 U.S.C. § 6321. Id. at
61.
9. Id. at 52 ("We hold that the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens.").
10. Compare In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246,256 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (concluding that
federal bankruptcy law predominates over the state law relation-back doctrine), aff'd, 286 B.R.
173 (N.D. Iowa 2001) with Grassmueck v. Nistler (In re Nistler), 259 B.R. 723,726-27 (Bankr.
D. Or. 2001) (distinguishing Drye on the grounds that the IRS has superior rights over other
creditors).
1I. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 56 (discussing precedent concluding that I.R.C. § 6321 gives a
broad construction to "property," thus giving the federal government vast power to determine
which property of the delinquent taxpayer is subject to a tax lien).
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The issue of prepetition disclaimers appears very technical, but it has
important policy implications regarding federal involvement in defining
property rights. The issue also has interesting implications regarding the power
relationship between creditors and debtors. What is the underlying rationale of
the power to disclaim? Is it merely a way to cheat one's creditors, or is it a
power that prevents creditors from overreaching into property upon which they
did not rely when extending credit? Is it a legitimate device by which a person
can protect property with sentimental value, or is it a license for sons and
daughters of the wealthy to spend extravagantly with the comfort of knowing
that creditors will not attach family property? This Note attempts to answer
these questions, focusing on the issue of disclaimers in advance of bankruptcy.
Part II of this Note discusses the common law and state statutory regimes
that permit disclaimers. Part MIl considers whether the federal Bankruptcy Code
permits prepetition disclaimers. In order to highlight the federal treatment of
disclaimers, Part II.A explores what constitutes a transfer of a debtor's interest
in property. Part III.B explores whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Drye
applies to prepetition disclaimers. Finally, Parts IV and V consider policy
arguments for and against permitting the use of disclaimers in advance of
bankruptcy. In Part VI, this Note concludes that state law should control
prepetition disclaimers. Principles of federalism and equitable distribution
form the basis of this conclusion.
II. State Law Treatment of Disclaimers
Long-standing common law doctrine permits debtors to disclaim
testamentary giftS.' 2 Some courts and commentators have recently noticed state
trends toward curtailing disclaimers by applying fraudulent transfer statutes.'
3
However, many state courts consistently hold that disclaimers do not amount to
fraudulent transfers.' 4 These courts base their conclusions on the relation-back
doctrine.'
12. See Mary Moers Wenig, Disclaimer. Handle with Care, 25 TAx MGMT. EST. GIFrs &
TR. J. 275, 277 (2000) (noting that very few cases prior to Drye departed from the long-standing
rule permitting a debtor to disclaim testamentary gifts); McCoskey, supra note 5, at 684 (same).
13. See Wenig, supra note 12, at 277 (surveying twenty reported cases from the 1990s
and finding that, despite a long-standing rule to the contrary, approximately half of those cases
held that a creditor may take property regardless of a debtor's disclaimer); see also Stein v.
Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio 1985) (noting that an increasing number of states have
ruled that a disclaimer is a transfer of property similar to the exercise of a general power of
appointment that creditors may attack as fraudulent).
14. See Wood v. Bright (In re Bright), 241 B.R. 664,671 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that a "vast majority" of state courts have held that a disclaimer cannot constitute a fraudulent
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A. Relation-Back Doctrine
Under the relation-back doctrine, a testator's estate does not automatically
vest in a disclaiming beneficiary at the time of the testator's death. 16 When the
beneficiary disclaims, the disclaimer "relates back" to the time of the testator's
death, and the property passes as if the beneficiary had predeceased the
testator.' 7 Many states have statutes that codify the common law relation-back
doctrine.
18
Under common law, the relation-back doctrine does not apply when
property passes by intestacy.'9 A beneficiary under a will need not accept a
testamentary gift, but under intestacy, the property descends automatically upon
the decedent's death, irrespective of the taker's intention to accept or reject the
conveyance under state law).
15. See, e.g., Tompkins State Bank v. Niles, 537 N.E.2d 274, 279 (III. 1989) (concluding
that under the state's disclaimer statute, a disclaimer related back to the date of the testator's
death and had the effect of barring the passage of title or vesting of the estate in the defendant);
Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Co. v. Estate of Martin, 666 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (same); Baltrusaitis v. Cook, 435 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a
judgment debtor could disclaim an interest in her deceased husband's life insurance policy
because the disclaimer related back to before the effective date of the insurance contract); Parks
v. Parker, 957 S.W.2d 666, 669-70 (Tex. App. 1997) (concluding that a judgment debtor's
disclaimer was effective because it related back to the date of the testator's death); Abbott v.
Willey, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Va. 1997) (permitting ajudgment debtor to disclaim life insurance
benefits because the disclaimer related back to the effective date of the insurance policy and the
statute contained no exception for creditors to contest a disclaimer based on fraudulent transfer).
16. See, e.g., Tompkins State Bank v. Niles, 537 N.E.2d 274, 279 (111. 1989) (explaining
that title does not vest in a devisee if the devisee disclaims).
17. See id. (noting that present property interests, when disclaimed, descend as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the decedent).
18. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 283 (West 2002) ("A disclaimer is not a fraudulent
transfer by the beneficiary."); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 283 Law Review Commission cmt.
(West 2002) (stating that the 1990 revision rejected the rule of In re Estate of Kalt, 108 P.2d
401 (Cal. 1940), that a disclaimer after a testator's death may be a fraudulent conveyance); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.801(3)(a) (West Supp. 2003) (stating that the "interest disclaimed shall
descend ... in the same manner as if the disclaimant had died immediately preceding the death"
of the testator and that "[t]he disclaimer shall relate to that date for all purposes."); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-193 (Michie 2002) (providing that "property ... disclaimed and any future interest
which is to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of the interest
disclaimed shall be distributed as if the disclaimant had died before the effective date of the
nontestamentary instrument").
19. See Christian Marius Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 568,
574-75 (1953) (presenting authorities for the notion that a disclaimer does not prevent property
from vesting in an heir taking title by intestacy between the time of decedent's death and the
disclaimer); see also Bostian v. Milens, 193 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (stating that
title to property passes automatically if a decedent dies intestate, regardless of a taker's intention
to receive it).
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property.2 ° Although some modem statutes remove the practical distinction
between testacy and intestacy in disclaimers,2 the common law distinction
remains instructive of the assumptions underlying the relation-back doctrine.
The relation-back doctrine rests on the principle that a devise is merely an offer
that a devisee can either accept or reject.22 If a devisee rejects a gift of
property, he never possesses the asset and his disclaimer is not a fraudulent
transfer.23
In order to disclaim property, a disclaimant must comply with statutory
filing requirements.24 When a beneficiary disclaims in compliance with all of
the statutory provisions, a court will treat him as if he predeceased the testator,
without regard to the beneficiary's motive or reason for disclaiming. 25 A few
states have repealed their disclaimer filing requirements and replaced them with
the new Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (UDPIA).
26
Interestingly, the Uniform Law Commission plans to incorporate UDPIA into
the next revision of the Uniform Probate Code.27 This incorporation will likely
have a positive effect on the willingness of states to adopt UDPIA2
20. See Bostian, 193 S.W.2d at 801 (providing that a testator's will does not require a
devisee to accept a gift of property because property under a will does not automatically vest in
the devisee as it does in an heir through intestacy).
2 1. See, e.g., In re Estate ofDankner, 384 N.Y.S.2d 683,684 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (noting that,
through the enactment of EPTL 4-1.3, the legislature granted distributees under intestacy
identical rights to disclaim property that devisees had under common law).
22. See Welder v. Hitchcock, 617 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (expressing the
theory that a devise in a will is an offer that a devisee may accept or reject, but that the intestate
share vests immediately in an heir upon the decedent's death).
23. See Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Co. v. Estate of Martin, 666 N.E.2d 411,415 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that a "disclaimer is not a transfer because the disclaimant is merely
rejecting a gift").
24. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 25 (1990) (making a disclaimer effective upon filing in
district court and delivering copies to the executor or trustee and, if the disclaimer is of real
property, the county clerk).
25. See Estate of Oot, 408 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (stating that motives for
renunciation "have no bearing" on the right to disclaim unless evidence of fraud or collusion
exists).
26. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-10-1 etseq. (Michie 2001) (replacing Section 45-2-
801(C) of the New Mexico Statutes, which was repealed in 2001); see also Adam J. Hirsch,
Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 109, 110 & nn.4-5 (2001) (reporting that the drafters completed UDPIA in 1999,
and by 2001, Hawaii, New Mexico, and North Dakota had adopted it).
27. See Prefatory Note, UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT (1999)
(reporting that UDPIA "will be incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code to replace current
UPC § 2-801").
28. See Hirsch, supra note 26, at 10 & n.7 (noting that eleven states have already
enacted UPC Article 11).
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UDPIA abandons the relation-back doctrine, but specifies that a disclaimer
"is not a transfer, assignment, or release."29 UDPIA leaves the matter of
creditors' claims in the context of disclaimers to the state statutory law in effect
prior to adoption of the Act.30 However, state precedents on disclaimer law will
likely be void after the adoption of UDPLA, so states will be able to completely
reevaluate their case law on disclaimers."
B. Fraudulent Transfer Statutes
Irrespective of the federal Bankruptcy Code, most states have fraudulent
transfer statutes that could arguably apply to defeat prepetition disclaimers.
Many states have adopted some version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA).32 Under UFTA, "[a] transfer made.., by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor ... if the debtor made the transfer.., with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud" the creditor.33 UFTA defines "transfer" as "every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other
encumbrance. 04
Many state courts hold that the relation-back principle precludes the
vesting of any property interest in the disclaimant, so the disclaimer cannot be a
fraudulent transfer.35 But Ohio has decided that a disclaimer is a fraudulent
transfer against creditors who had claims at the time of the testator's death.
36
29. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 68 (3d ed. 2002) (citing UDPIA § 5(e)-(f)).
30. See Hirsch, supra note 4, at 574 (noting that the UPDIA fails to resolve the fraudulent
conveyances issue but that it respects any bar to disclaimers contained in state statutes).
31. See id. ("Decisions construing prior statutes should lose their authority once the
statutes are replaced by UDPIA.").
32. See WAGGONER, ET AL., supra note 29, at 450 (reporting that about forty states have
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (1984) and about five states have adopted the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (1918)).
33. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(l) (1984).
34. Id. § 1(12).
35. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (noting that state courts following the
relation-back principle do not view disclaimers as fraudulent transfers); see also TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(12) (Vernon 2002) (stating that a "transfer," for fraudulent transfer
purposes, does not include disclaimers).
36. See Stein v. Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ohio 1985) (holding that a disclaimer
with the actual intent to defraud a present or future creditor is a fraudulent conveyance under
Section 1336.07 of the Ohio Revised Code and has no legal effect); McGraw v. Betz (In re
Betz), 84 BR. 470,472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law to find that a disclaimer
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Ohio views the power to disclaim as analogous to a general power of
appointment under which the disclaimant can decide who will receive the
disclaimed property." The tension in state law between the relation-back
theory and state fraudulent transfer statutes mirrors the tension between state
laws permitting disclaimers and the federal fraudulent conveyances statute, 1 1
U.S.C. § 548(a).3"
III. Federal Law Treatment of Disclaimers
Federal tax and bankruptcy laws often conflict with state disclaimer
statutes. Under federal tax law, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) permits
"qualified disclaimers" for estate and gift tax planning purposes.39 But the
Supreme Court has construed the I.R.C. to prohibit disclaimers for avoiding
collection on tax liens.4
In bankruptcy, federal law appears to affect disclaimers differently
depending on whether the disclaimer occurs before or after the debtor files for
bankruptcy.4' The Bankruptcy Code treats any interest in property held by the
debtor at the time of filing, or acquired within 180 days after filing, as part of
the bankruptcy estate.42 The Bankruptcy Code specifically lists bequests,
devises, and inheritances as property that may enter the bankruptcy estate.43
for the purpose of letting family, rather than creditors, receive property is a fraudulent
conveyance).
37. See Stein, 480 N.E.2d at 1123 (following Justice Traynor's reasoning in Kalt v.
Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1940), that the right to disclaim is "closely
analogous to a general power of appointment and, therefore, subject to the scrutiny of the
fraudulent conveyance statutes").
38. See infra Part III.B (noting that a possible implication of Drye v. United States, 528
U.S. 49 (1999) is that II U.S.C. § 548(a) defeats disclaimers occurring within one year prior to
filing a bankruptcy petition).
39. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2518(a)-(b), 2046, 2614(c) (2002) (identifying various rules for
qualified disclaimers).
40. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 57 & n.3 (1999) (observing that the qualified
disclaimer rules appear in the wealth transfer provisions of the I.R.C. but do not appear in the
tax lien provisions).
41. See McCoskey, supra note 5, at 684-90 (discussing the different Bankruptcy Code
provisions that appear to apply to prepetition and postpetition disclaimers and opining that
estate planners should counsel debtors that courts are more likely to allow prepetition
disclaimers).
42. II U.S.C. § 541 (a)(5) (2003); see also Parker, supra note 5, at 35 (surveying current
case law holding that disclaimed property becomes "property of the estate" under § 541(a)(5) if
the debtor files for bankruptcy and later disclaims).
43. II U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) (2003).
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If the debtor disclaims prior to filing for bankruptcy, he may keep the
property out of the bankruptcy estate as long as the federal fraudulent transfer
provisions do not apply." These Bankruptcy Code provisions at 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a) empower the bankruptcy trustee to "avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property" made within one year prior to filing a bankruptcy
petition if the debtor made the transfer with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud" his creditors or if the debtor "received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer. '" 4' Whether this section applies
depends on whether the disclaimer amounts to a "transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property" during the one-year period prior to filing.46
A. What Constitutes a Transfer of an Interest in Property?
The Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting
with property or with an interest in property .... ,,,7 The Bankruptcy Code
does not define the terms "property" or "interest in property., 48 In the absence
of controlling bankruptcy law, state law must govern the determination of
property interests in the debtor's estate.49
Congress intended some federal bankruptcy provisions, including 11
U.S.C. § 541, to require a broader construction of "property interests" than state
law allows.50 But Congress has never intended anything other than state law
44. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (expressing uncertainty as to whether the
Bankruptcy Code treats prepetition disclaimers as fraudulent transfers).
45. I U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(A)-(B) (2003).
46. See McCoskey, supra note 5, at 685 (describing a disclaimer as a transfer, but noting
that a disclaimer may not fall under the fraudulent transfer provisions because of uncertainty
whether the debtor ever possesses any interest in disclaimed property under the relation-back
doctrine).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2003).
48. See Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (in re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 18 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002)
(observing that the Bankruptcy Code "does not state what constitutes" a property interest and
concluding that state law must control).
49. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (reasoning that state law creates
and defines property interests in federal bankruptcy proceedings unless federal law requires a
different result); Bamhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (explaining that federal law
controls what constitutes "transfer" but "[i]n the absence of any controlling federal law,
'property' and 'interests in property' are creatures of state law").
50. See Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924) (recognizing congressional intent
for a broad construction of bankruptcy provisions governing assets to include in the bankruptcy
estate); Jess v. Carey (In re Jess), 169 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) ("While state law may
ultimately determine whether an asset is property of the estate, in the final analysis section
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definitions of "property interests" to control under the federal fraudulent
transfer provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 548.1 In states that apply the relation-
back doctrine, disclaimed property does not become an "interest of the
debtor in property" pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).52
State law generally governs what constitutes "property interests" in
bankruptcy, but recent jurisprudence on what constitutes a property interest
in federal tax law could change that. In 1998, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United
States,53 concluding that a disclaimer cannot remove property from the
reach of a federal tax lien. 4 The court found clear congressional intent for
26 U.S.C. § 6321 to place limits on the role of state law in determining
what property the IRS may reach to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities.55
The court reasoned that state law defines a taxpayer's property interests, but
541(a) supplies the basic definition." (citing In re Jess, 215 B.R. 618, 621 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1997))).
51. See Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson), 36 F.3d 450, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)
(applying Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992), and concluding that state law defines
property interests under the fraudulent transfer provisions because § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code does not define property interests). But cf United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198,
205 & n. 10 (1983) (noting that § 548 can bring property into the estate in which the debtor did
not have a possessory interest at the time of filing, such as property that the IRS had
repossessed).
52. See Garrett, 281 B.R. at 20-21 (asserting that a disclaimer under Oklahoma law
"relates backfor all purposes, including for the purpose of determining whether there was a
fraudulent transfer," so § 548 does not affect the inclusion of disclaimed property in the
bankruptcy estate); Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556, 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1989) (stating that the Illinois disclaimer statute prevented disclaimed property from vesting in
the debtor, so the disclaimer was not a transfer of an interest in property under I 1 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)), aff'd, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1998). In Drye
Family 1995 Trust, a taxpayer claimed that the district court erred in failing to hold that his
disclaimer voided any property interests on which a federal tax lien could attach. Id. at 892-93.
The court, noting a circuit split on the issue, applied Supreme Court precedent to conclude that
what constitutes "rights to property" under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 is ultimately a question of federal
law. Id. at 894. The court reasoned that, even though the I.R.C. does not define "rights to
property," Congress intended the reach of§ 6321 to be broad. Id. at 895. The court stated that
the state law consequences of the disclaimer under the doctrine of relation-back were "of no
concern to the operation of the federal tax law," and that the disclaimed property fell under
§ 6321. Id. at 898-99.
54. See id. at 898 (holding that state law consequences of a disclaimer cannot frustrate the
operation of federal tax law).
55. See id. at 899 (reasoning that the congressional intent for § 6321 suggests that
disclaimers cannot prevent the IRS from reaching "any and all interests of pecuniary value to
which a taxpayer may be entitled in order to satisfy outstanding tax liability").
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that federal law determines whether those interests constitute a "right to
property" pursuant to § 6321 .56
In Drye v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Drye
Family 1995 Trust." Drye arguably overruled contrary opinions from other
circuits that used state law to determine what property the IRS could reach
under a tax lien.58 Drye's approach to property interests under federal tax law
left lingering questions as to what constitutes a property interest for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Effect of Drye v. United States
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Drye concluded that federal
law ultimately controls whether a taxpayer has an interest in property subject to
a tax lien.59 The Court reasoned that the right to disclaim is a property interest
because the taxpayer could choose whether to receive all of the property or to
channel it to his daughter.6° Although it did not express what type of property
interest existed, the Court held that the taxpayer had an interest in property that
the IRS could subject to a federal tax lien in accordance with 26 U.S.C.
§ 6321.61
To support its conclusion, the Court cited the academic commentary of
Adam J. Hirsch, who compares the right to disclaim to the assignment of an
56. See id. at 898 (explaining that state law determines a right or interest and federal law
dictates whether that right or interest constitutes property reachable under § 6321 (quoting
United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 723 (1985))).
57. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1999) (reciting Eighth Circuit opinion
that "state law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right or interest," while
federal law determines whether that right or interest is a property interest under § 6321 (quoting
Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1998))).
58. See, e.g., Leggett v. United States, 120 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
state law must determine whether a taxpayer has a "property interest" because § 6321 does not
define that term); Mapes v. United States, 15 F.3d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that state
law must answer the question whether a taxpayer has an interest in property); United States v.
Davidson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154-55 (D. Colo. 1999) (declining to interpret subsequent
court decisions as overruling precedent that state law defines property rights, even for purposes
of federal tax liens (citing Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960) and United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51,78 (1958))).
59 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 55-58 (citing precedent that § 6321 provides a broad definition
of "property" that gives the federal government control in determining what property of a
delinquent taxpayer falls under a tax lien).
60. See id. at 60-61 (concluding that the right to disclaim is not a choice between the
acceptance or rejection of property, but amounts to control over who will receive the property).
61. See id. at 61 (holding that a taxpayer had "rights to property" under § 6321 because he
exercised dominion over it in determining who would receive the property).
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inheritance and, alternatively, to the exercise of a general power of
appointment.62 These analogies seem to confirm various state court opinions
concluding that disclaimers should fail under fraudulent conveyance statutes.63
But the Hirsch article ultimately rejects these analogies and describes the
disclaimer as a "quasi-conveyance" in which a disclaimant determines who will
take property by examining the will before deciding to disclaim. 64 Due to the
difficulty of assigning disclaimers a place in the complex realm of property
theory, Hirsch suggests that a better approach would be to decide the disclaimer
issue on the basis of public policy.
65
It appears that the Court took Hirsch's advice and resolved Drye on the
basis of public policy concerns rather than on the theoretical grounds of what
constitutes an interest in property.66 The Court's discussion of a devisee's
dominion over disclaimed property was something of an afterthought, coming
at the end of the decision after it was clear that the Court would uphold the
Eighth Circuit's decision on other grounds 7.6 The bulk of the decision focused
on the IRS's power to reach property regardless of state law hurdles.68 As such,
the Court could have rested the theoretical underpinnings of this case on the
concept of "imperium ' 69 rather than on "dominium.
70
62. See id. (citing Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L.
REv. 587, 607-08 (1989)) (concluding that the taxpayer's exercise of a disclaimer amounted to
a property right because he exercised dominion over who would ultimately receive the
property).
63. See, e.g., Stein v. Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio 1985) (following Justice
Traynor's reasoning in Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1940), that
the right to disclaim is "closely analogous to a general power of appointment and, therefore,
subject to the scrutiny of the fraudulent conveyance statutes").
64. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 587,
607-08 (1989) (arguing that a disclaimant does not actually accept property and cannot actually
assign it, but since he can examine the will to determine who receives property upon a
disclaimer, it is a "quasi-conveyance").
65. See id. at 609-10 (questioning the usefulness of dominion theory by stating that it
offers no basis for effectively characterizing ownership rights in disclaimed property and by
suggesting that such an approach might be inconsistent with the public policy goals of debtor-
creditor law).
66. See Andrew S. Bender, Note, Disclaimer Law: A Callfor Statutory Reform, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. 887, 907 (2001) (speculating that the Court decided Drye on the narrow issue of
protecting the functionality of the federal tax system).
67. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 59-61 (1999) (presenting the rationale that
the federal power to collect taxes trumps state law and afterward presenting the additional
rationale that the right to disclaim resembles a property right).
68. See id. at 59 (comparing state disclaimer law to state exemptions that do not bind the
federal tax collector).
69. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 757 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "imperium" as the
absolute legal authority of the state, a term that derives from the Roman Empire).
1060
A CLASH OF EXPECTATIONS
Lower courts have disagreed as to whether Drye's holding should extend
to disclaimers for avoiding creditors other than the IRS. In In re Kloubec,7" a
case that follows Drye, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa
concluded that, "even though Drye was a tax lien case, the issue decided was
identical to the issue presented here, that is, whether the state doctrine of
relationship-back can modify rights created under Federal Statutes.1
72
According to the court, the disclaimer had the effect of channeling property out
of the bankruptcy estate and "into the hands of Debtor's children. 73 This
reasoning appears to rest on the theory that the debtor had rights in the
disclaimed property, thus placing the property within the bankruptcy estate.74
Going further than Drye, in which the Supreme Court largely focused on the
federal government's strong interests in tax collection, 7 Kloubec seems to
exclusively rely on the dominion theories that the Hirsch article acknowledged
but ultimately rejected.76
Although few recent cases reach the issue of prepetition disclaimers, most
of them limit the application of Drye to tax lien cases pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 6321. In one case, Grassmueck v. Nistler (In re Nistler),77 the Bankruptcy
70. See id. at 502 (defining "dominium" as the absolute right to private ownership of
property, including the right to possession and use).
71. In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000), aff'd, 268 B.R. 173 (N.D.
Iowa 2001). In KIoubec, a debtor who stood to inherit a portion of his grandfather's estate
disclaimed one day before filing a petition for Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Id. at 250. On the
disclaimer issue, the court considered whether the disclaimer was a transfer of any interest of the
debtor that would amount to a fraudulent transfer. Id. at 253. The court considered the effect of
Drye v. United States and concluded that Drye, even though it was a tax lien case, stood for the
principle that the state doctrine of relation-back could not modify rights created under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 256. The court ruled that the disclaimer was a fraudulent transfer
because it channeled at least $85,000 of inherited assets from the bankruptcy estate to the
debtor's children. Id.
72. Id. at 256.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., I 1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(2000)(includinginthebankruptcyestatepropertyin
which the debtor has an ownership interest on the date of filing).
75. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court resolved
Drye on the basis of absolute federal supremacy in tax collection).
76. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (describing the commentary of
Professor Hirsch, who evaluated comparisons of a disclaimer to the assignment of inheritance
and to the exercise of a general power of appointment and concluded that both analogies are
imperfect and that the best approach would be to decide the issue on the basis of public policy).
77. Grassmueck v. Nistler (In reNistler), 259 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001). In Nistler,
a debtor disclaimed his right to receive property under will, trust, or intestacy from the estate of
Werner G. Nistler. Id. at 724. The debtor and his wife later filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id.
The trustee sought to avoid the disclaimer as a transfer under I I U.S.C. § 548. Id. at 725. The
court recognized that the primary issue was whether Drye v. United States indirectly overruled
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Court for the District of Oregon observed that Drye "specifically relied on the
language of § 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code."' 8 It further noted that "[a]ll
of the cases cited by the Drye Court involved tax liens. 79
Similar reasoning appears in another recent case, Garrett v. Bank of
Oklahoma (In re Faulk),8° in which the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma acknowledged that while Drye broadly construed 26
U.S.C. § 6321, that construction did not extend to I I U.S.C. § 548(a), under
which state law determines what constitutes an "interest in property.'
Another recent case also held that Drye did not change the fact that Congress
allows state law to determine the nature of property rights under § 548.82
Both Nistler and Garrett observed that Drye rests on precedent suggesting
that the IRS has superior rights over private creditors.8 3 The Nistler court
provided the distinction that state exemption statutes are not enforceable against
the IRS but are enforceable in bankruptcy.84 Congress's intent in drafting the
In re Bright, 241 B.R. 664 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999), which held that a disclaimer was not a
transfer of an interest in property under § 548. Id. The court distinguished Drye on grounds
that the Supreme Court based its decision on the broad language of 26 U.S.C. § 6321 and
justified its decision only with cases that involved tax liens. Id. at 726. The court ruled that
Nistler's disclaimer was not a transfer of an interest in property. Id. at 727.
78. Id. at 726.
79. Id.
80. Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002). In
Garrett, a debtor executed a prepetition disclaimer of his beneficiary status under a trust and the
bankruptcy trustee challenged the disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer under I I U.S.C. § 548. Id.
at 16. The issue was whether the disclaimer was "a transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property" under § 548. Id. at 17. The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not state what
constitutes an "interest in property" and that state law must determine that issue. Id. at 18. The
court distinguished Drye v. United States on two grounds: (1) the tax lien in Drye had already
attached to the property before the debtor disclaimed, making the disclaimer more similar to a
postpetition, rather than prepetition disclaimer, and (2) Drye was a tax lien case in which the
IRS had superior rights over other creditors. Id. at 20.
81. See id. (noting that Drye broadly construed the tax lien statute, l.R.C. § 6321, in line
with precedent viewing the rights of the IRS as superior to those of other creditors, whereas the
Bankruptcy Code in § 548(a) requires a state law determination of what constitutes an "interest
in property").
82. See Cassel v. Kolb, 267 B.R. 861,866 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001) (acknowledging that
federal law deems state disclaimers inoperable for tax liens, but asserting that state law
predominates in determining what assets make up the bankruptcy estate (citing Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979))).
83. See Garrett, 281 B.R. at 20 (noting that the Drye Court "cited cases holding that the
Internal Revenue Service has rights superior to those of other creditors of a taxpayer");
Grassmueck v. Nistler (In re Nistler), 259 B.R. 723,726 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001) ("There are many
instances where the IRS has superior rights over other creditors .... ").
84. See Nistler, 259 B.R. at 726-27 (providing example that the IRS has superior rights
over other creditors in that "state exemption statutes are not enforceable against the IRS").
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I.R.C. was not to recognize state law exemptions.85 In 26 U.S.C. § 6334,
Congress provided an exhaustive list of creditor-specific exemptions, showing
an intent that tax law should ignore state law exemptions.86 In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Code generally respects state exemptions. 87 Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522, debtors may choose to apply either the federal law exemptions in the
Bankruptcy Code or the exemptions available under the law of the debtor's
state.88 State governments may also "opt out" of the federal exemption rules
and require all bankruptcy exemptions to comply with state law.8 9
In addition to reasoning that the IRS has superior rights over private sector
creditors, the Garrett court observed that the tax lien in Drye had already
attached when the debtor disclaimed. 90 Thus, the court concluded that Drye
could only apply to postpetition disclaimers and not to prepetition disclaimers. 9'
The tax lien in Drye had already attached when the debtor disclaimed, whereas
the debtor in Garrett disclaimed prior to filing for bankruptcy. 92 The
distinction is that most courts treat postpetition disclaimers as invalid, while
they generally treat prepetition disclaimers as valid.93 Further, the debtor in
Drye disclaimed property he had inherited by intestacy.94 Although the court
85. See United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958) ("The provisions of the Internal
Revenue Act creating liens upon taxpayer's [sic] property for unpaid income taxes, unlike...
the Bankruptcy Act ... do not specifically provide for recognition of such state laws.").
86. See Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that Congress intended that federal tax law not respect state law exemptions because
26 U.S.C. § 6334 provides an exhaustive list of tax law property exemptions).
87. 1 WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, Scowr oN TRuSTS § 36.1, at 396 (4th ed. 1987).
88. See I I U.S.C. § 522(b) (2003) (giving the debtor a choice between applying federal
bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d) or applying exemptions under state law and non-bankruptcy
federal law).
89. See id. § 522(b)(I) (2003) (specifying that "an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate ... property that is specified under [the federal exemption provisions],
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor.., specifically does not so authorize").
90. See Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15,20 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002)
(distinguishing this case from Drye, in which the government attached a tax lien prior to the
debtor's filing of a disclaimer).
91. See id. (noting that the situation in Drye was analogous to filing a postpetition
disclaimer in which property became part of the bankruptcy estate prior to the debtor filing a
disclaimer).
92. See id. (distinguishing the facts in Drye).
93. See id. (stating that postpetition disclaimers are not valid in bankruptcy but that
prepetition disclaimers are effective because they do not qualify as fraudulent transfers); see
also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (noting that any interest in property included in
the debtor's estate at the time of filing or 180 days thereafter becomes a part of the bankruptcy
estate regardless of a disclaimer, but that a disclaimer occurring prior to debtor's filing for
bankruptcy is valid if the federal fraudulent transfer provisions do not apply).
94. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) (reciting the fact that the debtor's
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did not address any distinction between taking by intestacy or by will, common law
does not allow disclaimers of property passing by intestacy.95
IV Policy Considerations
Based on the above discussion, when state disclaimer law applies the relation-
back doctrine, a debtor's prepetition disclaimer clearly does not amount to a
fraudulent transfer. This Note now turns to the policy question of whether federal
law should allow this result. In other words, should federal law defeat disclaimers,
regardless of state laws applying the relation-back doctrine? In considering the
question, this Note examines various arguments, including the tension between
effectuating the principles of the Bankruptcy Code and respecting the principles of
federalism, and also the tension between fairness to creditors and fairness to debtors.
A. Uniformity in Bankruptcy Laws
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "establish ... uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. 96 At first glance, this clause
seems to require uniformity in the impact of bankruptcy laws. 97 But the authority to
establish uniform laws does not necessarily imply a requirement to establish them.
The Supreme Court, in construing the constitutional authorization for bankruptcy
laws, tends to enforce federal law only on issues that Congress has directly
addressed. 98 The Bankruptcy Code does not address what constitutes a property
interest.99 Ample precedent suggests that state law governs the issue of whether
disclaiming defeats a debtor's rights in the disclaimed property.'0°
mother died intestate).
95. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (explaining the common law
distinction between disclaimers in intestacy and disclaimers under wills).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97. See David E. Leigh, Note, Renunciation of a Legacy or Devise as a Fraudulent
Transfer Under the Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L.J. 290, 297 (1974) (arguing that the Constitution
requires uniformity in bankruptcy laws).
98. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1945) (stating that
what constitutes a "transfer" is a federal question because the federal bankruptcy statute directly
addresses it).
99. See Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 18 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002)
(noting that the Bankruptcy Code "does not state what constitutes" a property interest, so state
law must control).
100. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (stating that federal law
defines "transfer," but "[i]n the absence of any controlling federal law, 'property' and 'interests
in property' are creatures of state law"); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)
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Numerous commentators lament the lack of uniformity that results from
applying state law principles to certain bankruptcy-related issues that the
Bankruptcy Code does not address.'0 ' Particularly in the area of disclaimers,
this lack of uniformity can be profound because different states take different
approaches to disclaimers.'0 2 This divergence can result in uncertainty and
forum shopping.'0 3
Stephen Parker argues that federal courts should interpret the word
"transfer" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) to include disclaimers.' 4 In support of this
argument, Parker notes the similarity between the definitions of "transfer" in
the Bankruptcy Code and in the I.R.C.'0° Parker's reasoning fails because the
I.R.C. directly addresses the issue of disclaimers while the Bankruptcy Code
does not. The I.R.C. expressly preempts state law on qualified disclaimers for
estate and gift tax purposes. 0 6 In this context, the I.R.C. views a disclaimer as
a transfer of property.'0 7 The Bankruptcy Code does not provide similar clarity
on disclaimers.
For the Bankruptcy Code to preempt a disclaimer, state law must
determine that the debtor has obtained an interest in property and that the
debtor has fraudulently transferred the property by way of the disclaimer.'0
(reasoning that state law creates and defines property interests in federal bankruptcy proceedings
unless federal law requires a different result).
101. See Parker, supra note 5, at 48 (noting that the application of state law on disclaimers
defeats the Bankruptcy Code's goal of uniformity); Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in
Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 407-08 (1972) (criticizing federal
bankruptcy laws as a "helter-skelter" mix of federal provisions and state substantive law).
102. See Parker, supra note 5, at 48 (explaining that federal proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Code will produce divergent results based on the different treatment of disclaimers
under different states' laws); see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (noting that
many states follow the common law rule permitting disclaimers, whereas others apply fraudulent
transfer statutes to curtail the power of disclaimers to defeat creditors' claims).
103. See Parker, supra note 5, at 48 & n. 138 ("Uniform treatment of property interests by
both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty [and] to discourage
forum shopping." (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979))).
104. See id. at 49 (asserting that the relation-back doctrine provides debtors with the
opportunity to abuse disclaimers in bankruptcy cases).
105. See id. (arguing that courts should interpret "transfer" as it applies to disclaimers in
bankruptcy in the same way that McDonald v. Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1494, 1499 (8th Cir.
1988) applied the definition of "transfer" under the I.R.C.).
106. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2518(a)-(b), 2046, 2614(c) (2003) (identifying the various rules for
qualified disclaimers).
107. See McDonald v. Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1494, 1499 (8th Cir. 1988) (providing that a
qualified disclaimer, under 26 U.S.C. § 2518, is an indirect transfer that falls within the
language of the gift tax statute).
108. See Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson), 36 F.3d 450,452 (5th Cir. 1994) (specifically
applying Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) and concluding that
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Despite this limitation, some courts take the approach that Stephen Parker
espoused and recharacterize disclaimers as "transfers" regardless of how state
law views the relevant property interests.'09 Under this approach, a court
construes a disclaimer as being a transfer despite the fact that the relation-back
doctrine treats the property as if the disclaimant had never accepted it." °
Justification for preempting the relation-back doctrine rests on the argument
that relation-back subverts the federal prerogative to define what constitutes a
"transfer.""' At the heart of this position is the view that the relation-back
doctrine is an archaic legal fiction that should not defeat the effective
administration of the Bankruptcy Code." 2
Irrespective of concerns about uniformity, Congress created a bare-bones
Bankruptcy Code that does not address every issue. In approaching a federal
statute, courts must presume that Congress intended its legislation to act in
concert with legal relationships that state law has already established." 3 Courts
must react to congressional silence by applying state law."1
4
state law defines property interests under the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions).
109. See Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 409-10 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1993) (construing a disclaimer as a transfer under I I U.S.C. § 101 (54)); Casciato v. Stevens (In
re Stevens), 112 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (same); Nashville City Bank & Trust
Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (same); In re Estate of
Scrivani, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (treating a disclaimer as a transfer of a
resource despite the relation-back doctrine, causing the state to view the disclaimed property as
part of the disclaimant's "available resources" that the state counted to determine the
disclaimant's Medicare eligibility).
I10. See, e.g., Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 410 (characterizing disclaimers as transfers because
"no matter what state law says the effect of such a disclaimer might be, state law may not define
the transfer away").
11I. See id. (reasoning that the application of relation-back amounts to state subversion of
the federal prerogative to construe what constitutes a "transfer").
112. See id. at 409 & n. 15 (criticizing the circular logic of the relation-back doctrine); In re
Dinsdale, 1993 WL 1112064, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 1993) (same), aff'd, Agristor
Leasing v. Dinsdale, 1995 WL 1312673 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 6, 1995); Nashville City Bank & Trust
Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (reasoning that state law
fictions cannot defeat the "express limitations periods" in the Bankruptcy Code); see also
Hirsch, supra note 64, at 604 (criticizing the relation-back doctrine as a legal fiction arising out
of archaic considerations such as the evasion of feudal incidents).
113. See HENRY MELVIN HART & HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 521-22 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that Congress builds upon legal
relationships that states have already established and that those background rules remain in force
unless legislation expressly changes them).
114. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143,164-65 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the application of state statutes of limitations and stating,
"[A]fter a century and a half of the Court's reacting to congressional silence by applying state
statutes... it is reasonable to say that such a result is what Congress must expect, and hence
intend, by its silence."); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994) ("[W]here the
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B. Policies of the Bankruptcy Code
Many courts formalistically apply property theories to characterize
disclaimers as inside or outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent
transfer provisions." 5 Professor Hirsch suggests that a better approach would
be to decide the issue on the basis of the public policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Code.'" 6 When courts have invalidated disclaimers, they have
often included policy reasons such as upholding the "express limitations
periods" in the Bankruptcy Code." 17
In order to dispense with state property law and apply federal standards,
courts must overcome a traditionally strong presumption that state law governs
issues of family property and probate law.I " One situation that overcomes the
presumption is when Congress has directly addressed the issue and preempted
state law. 119 Courts may also overcome the presumption when state law
conflicts with policies underlying the federal statute, but only when those
policies are clear, substantial, and unequivocal." °
intent to override is doubtful, our federal system demands deference to long-established
traditions of state regulation.").
115. See Hirsch, supra note 64, at 602-10 (criticizing the case law on disclaimers as being
overly formalistic in its application of property theories).
116. See id. at 609-10, 651-54 (favoring a policy-based approach over the formalistic
application of property theories in determining whether disclaimers should survive federal
fraudulent transfer scrutiny); see also In re Dinsdale, 1993 WL 1112064, at *7 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa Sept. 19, 1993) (reasoning that, due to the difficulty of resolving whether relation-back
falls into the definitional categories of "transfer" or "property," courts should decide the
question of disclaimers based on policy considerations), aff'd, Agristor Leasing, 1995 WL
1312673 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 6, 1998).
117. See, e.g., Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 815
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (asserting that state law fictions cannot defeat the "express limitations
periods" in the Bankruptcy Code).
118. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (noting, in the context of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption analysis, that a presumption
exists against preemption in areas of traditional state regulation, including family law and
probate law).
119. See id at 151-52 (explaining that the Court has applied federal law when state law
conflicts with Congress's clear desire for preemption, such as in ERISA (citing Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833 (1997))).
120. See id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating, on the issue of family property law, that
federal law cannot control unless a court finds a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to
preempt state law (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995))). Also, federal law cannot control unless a court
finds that applying state law would do "major damage to clear and substantial federal interests."
Id. (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
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Respect for creditors' rights is one of the Bankruptcy Code's primary
policies. 121 This Note discusses the contractual expectations between debtors
and creditors at greater length below. 22 Because the goal of protecting private
sector creditors represents an entirely different federal interest from promoting
the effective administration of the I.R.C., the Supreme Court's opinion in Drye
does not support a creditors' rights argument.
123
Another of the Bankruptcy Code's primary policies is to give the debtor a
fresh start. 24 However, this "fresh start" does not apply to all categories of
debt. 21 Professor Hirsch suggests that the Bankruptcy Code's lonely
references to bequests, devises, and inheritances in § 541 display a policy to
except them from any "immediate fresh start."' 26 But Professor Hirsch's
argument fails in the prepetition context because § 541 does not apply to
disclaimers that a debtor executes prior to filing for bankruptcy. '27 Indeed, only
the fraudulent transfer provisions in § 548 appear to apply to prepetition
disclaimers.
28
The Bankruptcy Code also values administrative efficiency in the
distribution of the debtor's assets to creditors. 29 Although precedent suggests
121. Parker, supra note 5, at 34 & n.22 (explaining that the purpose of the automatic stay
provision under § 362 is to protect the interests of all creditors (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-297)).
122. See infra Part V (discussing creditors' and debtors' expectations and their impact on
whether disclaimers should be valid in bankruptcy).
123. See supra notes 66,68, 83 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court resolved
Drye on the basis of public policy concerns, including the necessity to protect the functionality
of the federal tax system and on the recognition of the IRS's superior rights over private sector
creditors).
124. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (acknowledging the Bankruptcy
Code's purpose of providing procedures whereby debtors can "reorder their affairs" and enjoy
the opportunity to be unhampered by debt (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934))).
125. See id. at 287 (recognizing congressional intent to exclude certain debts including
child support, alimony, unpaid educational loans, unpaid taxes, and liabilities arising from
fraud, from the general policy of discharge).
126. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy. The Meaning ofthe "Fresh Start", 45
HASTTGs L.J. 175, 180 (1994) ("Thus, section 541 (a)(5) distinguishes legacies from income
and carves out an exception to the traditional policy of an immediate fresh start.").
127. See I I U.S.C. § 541 (a)(5) (2003) (indicating that the bankruptcy estate will include
property that the debtor inherits on the date of filing or 180 days thereafter).
128. See supra Part Ill (explaining that a debtor, prior to filing bankruptcy, may keep
property out of the bankruptcy estate as long as the federal fraudulent transfer provisions do not
apply).
129. See In re Beaty, 306 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a fundamental
purpose of bankruptcy law is to secure "prompt and effectual administration and settlement of
the [debtor's] estate.., within a limited period" (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,328
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that state law controls the property rights of parties in a bankruptcy action, 30
some commentators suggest that a uniform federal approach would be more
efficient. 3 ' For purposes of analogy, this Note turns to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal statute that takes a uniform
federal approach to property rights in order to promote administrative
efficiency.'32
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,13  Justice Thomas delivered an opinion that
broadly construed the provision in ERISA that provides for federal preemption
of state law.1 34 He explained that one of Congress's primary goals in passing
ERISA was to "establish a uniform administration scheme, which provides a set
of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits."' 35  The Court reasoned that requiring multi-state employers to
understand and apply fifty different state property law regimes on beneficiary
designations under ERISA-qualified plans would undermine the congressional
goal of minimizing administrative burdens.1
36
(1966))); Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); see also
MARGARET HOWARD & PETER A. ALCES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 21 (2d ed.
2001) (recognizing the purpose of bankruptcy to "reduce overall collection costs and to preserve
the estate in order to maximize the creditors' recovery").
130. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating that no reason exists for
courts to depart from the practice of analyzing property interests under state law merely because
an interested party faces bankruptcy).
131. See Parker, supra note 5, at 48 (asserting that the application of state law in the
disclaimer context results in inconsistency).
132. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempts
state property law due to the federal interest in "uniform and comprehensive regulation" of
pension plans that have an effect on the national economy).
133. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). In Egeihoff, children whose father died in
a car accident sought to receive the death benefit from his life insurance policy. Id. at 144. The
decedent had designated his wife as beneficiary under the plan but had divorced his wife two
months before his death and had not changed the beneficiary designation. Id. A Washington
statute would have revoked the wife's designation as beneficiary on all nonprobate assets upon
the divorce, so the issue was whether ERISA preempted this state statute. Id. at 143-46. The
Court concluded that the statute had a "connection with" ERISA plans and that federal law
preempted it. Id. at 150. The Court reasoned that the Washington statute would interfere with
the uniform national plan administration that Congress clearly intended to create when it passed
ERISA. Id. at 148.
134. See id. at 146 (observing that the ERISA preemption provision in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) has an expansive reach).
135. See id. at 148 (reasoning that a Washington state statute would interfere with the
policy underlying ERISA (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987))).
136. See id. at 149-50 ("Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50
states... would undermine the congressional goal of 'minimiz[ing] the administrative and
financial burden[s]' on ... administrators.").
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The prepetition disclaimer situation does not pose the same degree of
administrative difficulty as the situation in Egelhoff. Because the bankruptcy
trustee would not begin the process of identifying property of the bankruptcy
estate until after the debtor had already completed his disclaimer, a prepetition
disclaimer would present minimal administrative burdens. To date, the author
finds no cases in which a court has applied the Bankruptcy Code's policy of
administrative efficiency to preempt state law and aid the bankruptcy trustee in
reaching property under the fraudulent transfer provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 548.
Congress has expressed a clear intent for ERISA to preempt state laws that
would otherwise apply to multi-state employee benefit plans. 37  The
Bankruptcy Code does not have such clear boundaries, especially as to the
definition of "property interests" in § 548. 138 Because state statutes are entitled
to a presumption of nonpreemption, 3 and because disclaimers do not seem to
frustrate any strong policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, it appears from
the "totality of the circumstances" that Congress leaves this issue to the
states. 141
C. Impact of Federalism
Preempting state law on the basis of a federal statute's underlying policy
creates difficulties in that a court might run afoul of the principles of federalism
and separation of powers.' 4' While federal courts may create binding doctrine
137. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992)
(acknowledging the breadth of ERISA's federal regulatory scheme and its clear provision in 29
U.S.C. § I 144(a) that federal law will supersede state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan" under ERISA).
138. See, e.g., Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 18(Bankr. W.D. Okla.
2002) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code "does not state what constitutes" a property interest and
that state law must control).
139. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("Consideration under the
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law.").
140. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S.
218, 224 (1993) (explaining that the application of preemption principles implicates three
questions: whether state law directly conflicts with federal law; whether applying state law
would frustrate the federal scheme; or whether, from the "totality of the circumstances,"
Congress apparently sought to displace state authority on a particular issue) (citations omitted).
141. See Bender, supra note 66 at 908 & n.219 (criticizing the Drye Court for judicial
activism and for encroaching on legislative power (citing Leggett v. United States, 120 F.3d
592, 598 (5th Cir. 1997))); Timothy R. West, Note, Drye v. United States: Limiting the
Traditional State Right to Define Property, 69 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 909, 909 (2001)
(charging that the Drye decision diminished state sovereignty).
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in areas where Congress has legislated, they should avoid developing a body of
federal common law in areas traditionally reserved to the states. 42 However, it
is often difficult for courts to draw the line between construing congressional
intent and creating new law.
The majority opinion in Egelhoffis surprising because Justice Thomas and
other justices who are usually "solicitous of state interests', 43 read ERISA to
preempt a state statute based on its underlying policy.44 One possible reason
why the majority reached this result was its hesitation to develop a body of
federal common law on the subject of family property. Justice Breyer,
writing for the dissent, wanted to partake in a line-by-line reading of the ERISA
statute "in order to determine how best to reconcile [the] . .. statute's language
and purpose with federalism's need to preserve state autonomy." 46 Justice
Breyer viewed the true test of federalism to lie not in cases trimming
Congress's commerce power at its edges, but in cases interpreting technical
detail to determine whether state or federal law should apply. 47 The majority
preferred a broad reading of the statute, suspecting that a line-by-line analysis
would place the Court in the position of circumventing Congress's prerogative
to reconcile the boundary between state and federal law.
14
142. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 404 (1964) (explaining that, although Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), disallows the application of general federal common law in areas reserved for state law,
it allows specific federal common law in areas where Congress has created federal law); Peter L.
Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REv. 891,
901-02 (2002) (reasoning that the majority in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001),
preferred to construe ERISA broadly rather than risk developing federal common law in specific
areas traditionally governed by state law that ERISA happens to preempt in application).
143. See Strauss, supra note 142, at 901 (commenting on Egeihoff, Strauss stated, "It is
striking that the majority, whose members have generally been so solicitous of state interests,
gave the federal statute such broad sweep.").
144. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141,148 (2001) (noting that the purpose of ERISA
is to establish a "uniform administration scheme" for employee benefit plans in nationwide
organizations).
145. See Strauss, supra note 142, at 902 ("For the majority, perhaps conscious of the
implications of their capacity to control the actions of lower courts, the development of a
common law on the subject was not to be trusted.").
146. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 160-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. See Strauss, supra note 142, at 902 (speculating that the Egelhoff majority feared
"acknowledging any responsibility for reconciling state and federal law for themselves,"
preferring to leave that responsibility with Congress, "or, rather, Congress's language as the
judges chose to read it").
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One year after deciding Egelhoff, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in United
States v. Craft49 that decried the majority opinion as coming perilously close to
establishing a new federal common law of property:
By erasing the careful line between state laws that purport to disclaim or
exempt property interests after the fact, which the federal tax lien does not
respect, and state laws' definition of property and property rights, which the
federal tax lien does respect, the Court does not follow Drye, but rather
creates a new federal common law of property.15
0
Interestingly, the majority in Craft cited Drye's treatment of disclaimers as
support for the proposition that a federal tax lien should apply to property held
in a tenancy by the entirety."' In Craft, the Court concluded that a husband's
rights in a tenancy by the entirety with his wife constituted an interest in
property to which the government could attach a tax lien, despite the fact that
the husband had no separate interest in the property under state law.
52
Thomas expressed concern that the majority in Craft had gone too far in
contravening the long-settled role of the states in creating property interests
upon which federal law may later attach consequences. 53 Thomas accused the
majority of misinterpreting Drye, arguing that the disclaimant in that case
sought to "retroactively undo a vested right in an estate the taxpayer already
held," while in Craft, the taxpayer never had a vested individual interest in the
property under state law.' 54 Indeed, the taxpayer in Drye executed his
149. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). In Craft, a delinquent taxpayer who
owned land as a tenant by the entirety with his wife executed a quitclaim deed to transfer his
entire interest in the property to his wife. Id. at 276-77. The United States claimed that its tax
lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety before he transferred it.
Id. at 277. State law would have applied the legal fiction that an individual tenant in a tenancy
by the entirety has no separate interest in the property. Id. at 276. The Court refused to enforce
this legal fiction and concluded that the husband had rights in the land because he could use the
property, exclude third parties from it, and receive an equal share of the income from it. Id. at
279-82. In concluding that the legal fiction did not control the federal question, the Court cited
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 53 (1999). Id. at 279.
150. Id. at 293-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 279 (supporting the proposition that state legal fictions cannot defeat the
federal prerogative to determine property interests on which the IRS may attach a tax lien (citing
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999))).
152. See id. at 277-82 (acknowledging that a husband had no separate interest under
Michigan law, but concluding that a tax lien on the husband's interest in a tenancy by the
entirety constituted a property interest because he enjoyed the power to use, exclude, and gamer
income from the property).
153. See id. at 294 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's usurpation of state
powers (quoting Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 n.3 (1960))).
154. See id. at 292-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Drye as a situation in which
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disclaimer only after a federal tax lien had attached, making his disclaimer
more analogous to a postpetition disclaimer.'"5
The difference between Justice Thomas's approaches in Egelhoff and
Craft demonstrates the difficulty of recognizing the extent to which broadly
worded federal statutes preempt state law. At first glance the approaches of
Justice Thomas in these cases appear inconsistent. But both opinions express
discomfort with a "busy-body" construction of federal statutes that gives the
Court too much power to impose its version of the law. Federalism, as the
Court has traditionally viewed it, clearly respects Congress as being in a better
position than the courts to determine whether state or federal law should apply
to a given issue.1 6 In construing federal statutes, courts should not apply the
federal rule unless the determination of Congress is clear, unambiguous, and
unmistakable.'57
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Craft resembles cases that use
criticism of common law fictions to justify federal usurpation of state property
law.158 But if courts are to follow the principles of federalism, they must take a
less cavalier attitude toward state policy prerogatives. Absent congressional
authorization, the principles of federalism and separation of powers mandate
that federal courts may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" or
intrude upon the states' ability to apply their own policies in traditional areas of
state law had already recognized a property interest in the taxpayer but that a disclaimer
retroactively divested that interest).
155. See Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15,20 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002)
(noting that the situation in Drye, in which the government attached a tax lien prior to the
taxpayer's filing of a disclaimer, was analogous to filing a postpetition disclaimer in which
property would become part of the bankruptcy estate prior to the debtor's filing of a disclaimer);
see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (noting that any interest in property included
in a debtor's estate at the time of filing or 180 days thereafter becomes part of the bankruptcy
estate regardless of a disclaimer, but that a prepetition disclaimer is valid if the federal
fraudulent transfer provisions do not apply).
156. See Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L.
Rav. 1682, 1685 (1974) (discussing the constitutional limits on federal judicial power in Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and arguing that Congress, not federal courts, should make the
law because Congress includes representatives from the states).
157. See id. at 1686 (reasoning that courts should not recognize a federal policy unless
Congress has "squarely and unmistakably" spoken in unambiguous terms on that issue); see also
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994) ("[W]here the intent to override is
doubtful, our federal system demands deference to long established traditions of state
regulation.").
158. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) ("Such state law labels are
irrelevant to the federal question of which bundles of rights constitute property that may be
attached by a federal tax lien."); see also supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text
(recognizing criticism of the relation-back doctrine in disclaimer cases).
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state competence.' 59 Surely property laws, especially those in the area of
disclaimers for estate planning purposes, are areas of traditional state
competence.
Prior to Drye, federal law did not create property rights but merely
attached consequences to property rights created under state law.'6° Absent
contrary congressional intent, courts upheld state laws that advanced important
state interests.' 61 This approach struck the proper balance between legitimate
and traditional state interests in defining property rights and the necessity of
uniformity in the administration of federal law. 62 Indeed, this balance rested
on the long-standing principle that federal courts cannot make law in the
absence of some clear constitutional or statutory authorization. 1
63
In light of its application in Craft, the Supreme Court's Drye decision
complicates matters. '64 The majority in Craft apparently viewed Drye as giving
the Court a green light to develop a new federal common law approach to
property rights that would trump state law, including the relation-back
doctrine. 65 Not all of the members of the unanimous Court in Drye would
view that case as having such an expansive scope. 66 Some members of that
Court would make a stricter analysis of the Bankruptcy Code before
159. See Mishkin, supra note 156, at 1686-87 & n. 18 (discussing the limits of federal
courts' power to intrude upon state policies in areas of state competence without express
authorization from Congress (quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970))).
160. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960) (reasoning that the Federal
Revenue Act does not create property rights but only attaches federal consequences to property
rights created by state law); United States v. Davidson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Colo.
1999) (same).
161. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 273-74 (3d Cir.
1984) (upholding a state environmental policy because it embodied an important state interest
and did not conflict with the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
162. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 514.
163. See Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler 's the Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 87 HARv. L. REv. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (arguing that Erie v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), recognized constitutional limitations on the power of federal courts to "displace
state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate"); Friendly, supra note 142,
at 421-22 (stating that courts may only create federal common law on "subjects within national
legislative power where Congress has so directed").
164. See also Bender, supra note 66, at 907 (asserting that the Drye opinion creates
uncertainty and confusion).
165. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278-79 (2002) (introducing a "bundle of
rights" approach to determining property interests pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321). This
approach appears to apply regardless of state property law. Id.
166. See id. at 289-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Thomas's dissent and
observing that the majority's approach nullifies, "insofar as federal taxes are concerned," one
traditional form of property ownership observed by many states).
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determining that its policy warrants disavowal of state law relation-back
principles in the prepetition context.1
67
V Equity and the Expectations of Creditors and Debtors
A disclaimer does not occur in a vacuum. Creditors and debtors maintain
certain expectations in the course of their relationship. These expectations
inevitably will clash when the disrupting event of bankruptcy occurs.
Bankruptcy courts, essentially being courts of equity, 68 seek to prevent
windfalls to any party.' 69 But bankruptcy courts ultimately face the dilemma of
choosing which party is in a better position to bear the incidence of loss. 70
A. Creditors' Expectations
The Introduction to this Note asks whether a disclaimer is merely a way to
cheat one's creditors. One answer to that question is that a disclaimer causes
the creditor to suffer "inequitable results"'' and gives a windfall to the ultimate
recipient of the property.172 It seems that a bankruptcy court could combine its
equity powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 with the fraudulent transfer provisions in
11 U.S.C. § 548 to defeat a disclaimer and deliver the disclaimed property to
creditors. But in order to use its equity powers to trump state law, a bankruptcy
court must observe either a specific grant of authority from Congress or face
167. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 13-14(2000)
(stating that courts will not assess the relative merits of bankruptcy policy in the absence of
direct congressional authority).
168. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,240 (1934) (stating that bankruptcy courts
have jurisdiction both at law and in equity); In re Lee Way Holding Co., 178 B.R. 976, 985
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) ("Bankruptcy courts have broad equity powers to balance the interests
of the relevant parties .... "); see also I I U.S.C. § 105 (2003) (codifying courts' broad equity
powers in bankruptcy).
169. See, e.g., Condor One, Inc. v. Homestead Partners, Ltd. (In re Homestead Partners,
Ltd.), 201 B.R. 1014, 1024 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that the Bankruptcy Court, as a
tribunal of equity, must strive to prevent inequitable windfalls).
170. Cf Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1048 (1987) (recognizing that the goal of discharge is to allocate the risk of loss
between the debtor and creditor in bankruptcy).
171. See Hirsch, supra note 64, at 610-11 & n. 122 (criticizing disclaimers as creating
"inequitable results" (citing Note, Renunciation of a Devise In Fraud of Creditors as a
Fraudulent Conveyance, 27 VA. L. REv. 936, 938-39 (1941))).
172. See Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal. 1940) (arguing
that the application of a disclaimer would yield a windfall to the ultimate recipient of the
property).
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other exceptional circumstances. 173  Those exceptional circumstances only
include situations in which the legislative history clearly shows that Congress
had strong policy objectives to justify applying a federal rule.
174
The protection of creditors is a strong policy objective of the Bankruptcy
Code. 7 5 Many courts and commentators have viewed debts as "moral
obligations" that a debtor must repay.176 But according to Professor Hirsch, the
policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code do not take on a moral tone. 177 Further,
Congress did not intend for the protection of creditors to come at the expense of
the rights of debtors. 78
Judge Posner advocates that the purpose of law is to promote the efficient
allocation of resources. 179  People make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty with the goal of maximizing their utility.'80 Thus, when two parties
reach a deal, they have effectively located a point at which they expect their
optimal utilities to intersect. In the course of the deal, the parties maintain
certain expectations that they have developed based on their reasonable
calculations of the costs, risks, and responsibilities of achieving optimal
173. See Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) ("From the ...
Burner opinion... as well as from the language of § 105(a) itself, it follows that, absent a
specific grant of authority from Congress or exceptional circumstances, a bankruptcy court may
not exercise its equitable powers to create substantive rights which do not exist under state
law.").
174. See id. at 273 (noting that courts can apply equity to suspend state law only to the
extent of an "actual conflict with the bankruptcy system provided by Congress"); In re Challa,
186 B.R. 750, 756-57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (demonstrating that a court can use its equity
power to override state law when clear policy foundations to do so exist in the Bankruptcy
Code).
175. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 5. at 34 & n.22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6296-97) (stating that the purpose of the automatic stay provision in I I U.S.C. § 362 is to
protect creditors' interests (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978)).
176. See Hirsch, supra note 64, at 610-11 & n.121-23 (surveying early cases and
commentators who viewed the payment of debts as a moral obligation and found disclaimers
and spendthrift trusts to be "morally wrong").
177. See id. at 611 (arguing that viewing debts as a moral obligation misconstrues the
arm's length nature of consensual debtor-creditor relationships); see also Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410,435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[B]ankruptcy law has little to do with natural
justice.").
178. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (acknowledging the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code to empower debtors to "reorder their affairs" and enjoy new opportunities
free of debt).
179. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757, 763-64
(1975) (discussing aspects of the legal system that contribute, both intentionally and
unintentionally, to the goal of promoting the most efficient allocation of resources).
180. See. id. at 761 (discussing the choices that parties to legal disputes make with the goal
of rationally maximizing their satisfaction under conditions of uncertainty).
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utility.' Bankruptcy frustrates the accomplishment of these expectations.
Therefore, bankruptcy law faces the dilemma of choosing which party should
bear the incidence of loss.'82
Many commentators agree that the risk of loss should fall on the party
most able to protect itself from loss. 183 But they disagree as to which party will
normally occupy that position. For some, the debtor is better able to bear the
risk of loss because he controls his own financial affairs. 8 4  For others,
creditors are more able to bear the risk of loss because they have better systems
of evaluating risk of default, insuring against bad debt, and diversifying their
risks.'85
Beyond the actuarial focus on risk of loss, the ultimate issue appears to be:
What expectations do creditors and debtors entertain? Creditors might indeed
expect that the property a debtor expects to receive by will is "fair game" in the
event of bankruptcy.' 86 But legal scholars have long recognized that creditors
who voluntarily enter arm's length transactions have "abundant means for their
own protection. 0
87
Because creditors take calculated risks when entering arm's length
transactions, a debtor does not hinder his creditors when he refuses to accept
181. See id. at 761-64 (discussing the rational calculations that parties make while
negotiating over legal disputes). But see DAVID A. SKEEL, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 200 (200 1) (noting criticism of the law-and-economics assumption that debtors make
rational, calculated decisions).
182. See Howard, supra note 170, at 1048 (noting that one goal of bankruptcy may be "to
achieve economic efficiency in its allocation of the risk of loss ... between debtor and
creditor").
183. See Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy in Modern Day Israel, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 555, 558 & n. 18 (1999) (citing commentary supporting the view that the
party who can best protect itself from the risk of loss should bear that risk in bankruptcy).
184. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953,
982-83 (1981) (arguing that debtors should bear the risk of loss because they normally have
greater responsibility and control over whether they will enter bankruptcy); Robert A. Hillman,
Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 126 (1990) (same).
185. See Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327, 362-63 (1982) (noting that creditors evaluate risk more
frequently and dispassionately than debtors, have better access to insurance, and self-insure
more effectively through diversification); Howard, supra note 170, at 1063-64 (observing that
commercial creditors are more able than consumer debtors to assess the likelihood of default
because they regularly assess actuarial data).
186. See Hirsch, supra note 126, at 192-93 (entertaining the notion that creditors might
rely on a debtor's inheritance prospects, especially when they are known to the creditor).
187. See ORLANDO F. BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 73 (2d ed. 1876) (arguing that
courts should not administer the law for the sole benefit of creditors because they "become
creditors by their own volition, and have abundant means for their own protection").
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property upon which the creditor never relied when calculating those risks. 88
Creditors generally do not consider a debtor's expectations of taking property
by will when assessing whether or not to do business with the debtor.8 9 Thus,
if creditors could reach a debtor's family property by defeating his disclaimer,
they actually would receive more than that for which they had bargained.' 90
Allowing creditors to reach the debtor's disclaimed property in this
situation would actually give creditors a windfall by reason of the debtor's
bankruptcy.' 9' This result is particularly disturbing given that the bankruptcy
court would have to trample on state property law to achieve such a result.' 92
Therefore, serious considerations weigh against disregarding prepetition
disclaimers.' 93 These considerations include preventing a windfall to creditors
and also promoting states' legitimate interests in "familial devotion and estate
planning" that justify their disclaimer laws.' 94
Despite its relevance to voluntary creditor-debtor relations, this
expectations analysis does not seem to apply in the context of involuntary
creditors. Professor Hirsch argues that courts should permit involuntary
creditors, such as tort claimants, to defeat a debtor's disclaimer.'95 In such
situations, the debtor incurs the debt without the creditor's consent, so he
188. See Hirsch, supra note 64, at 612-13 (demonstrating that a debtor's refusal to accept
property does not reduce creditors' opportunities for recovery, but only fails to increase them
beyond those opportunities that creditors agreed upon after calculating the risks of contracting
with the debtor).
189. See id. at 613-14 (noting that creditors would not rely on a debtors' inheritance
prospects when setting the price of credit, due to their inability to foresee access to the
inheritance and the difficulty of valuing uncertain expectancy interests).
190. See id. at 614 ("If creditors stood in a position to prevent disclaimers by insolvents
they would receive, literally, more than they bargained for: The expectancy of inheritance will
not be reflected in the price of credit.").
191. See id. at 614 n.135 ("[C]reditors would be the ones receiving a 'windfall' if they
could capture their debtors' expectancies!").
192. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Uniform treatment of property
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason
of the happenstance of bankruptcy."').
193. See Succession of Neuhauser, 579 So. 2d 437, 442 (La. 1991) (recognizing policy
problems in allowing a creditor to defeat a disclaimer merely because the disclaimer increased
debtor's insolvency (citing Hirsch, supra note 64, at 614)).
194. See id. at 442 (discussing legitimate motives for disclaimers that render the
"fraudulent transfer" label questionable).
195. See Hirsch, supra note 64, at 651-52 (employing a "bifurcated analysis" in which
voluntary creditors should have no right to prevent a debtor's disclaimer, but involuntary
creditors should be able to "veto" a debtor's disclaimer).
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assumes an "equitable obligation" to make the involuntary creditor whole. 1
96
But the vast majority of debtors are consumer debtors, and most of their
creditors are commercial lenders.' 97 Due to federalism concerns and in light of
the fact that the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish voluntary from
involuntary creditors, federal courts, in the absence of congressional action,
should not invalidate state law disclaimers for the benefit of involuntary
creditors.
B. Debtors' Expectations
This Note contemplates disclaimers by debtor beneficiaries who expect to
receive property under a will. Until the testator dies and the executor probates
his will, a debtor beneficiary merely has an expectancy interest in the
property.'98 Even after probate, if the debtor disclaims, the doctrine of relation-
back provides that no legal or equitable title ever vested in the debtor.199
Therefore, the debtor never has anything greater than an expectancy interest in
the property.
Most courts hold that a prospective beneficiary under a will cannot legally
transfer his expectancy interests in property.2'° But if state law allows such a
transfer, a court might apply equity to invalidate a disclaimer if the debtor has
previously assigned or pledged the property to a creditor. 20' Even if state law
does not allow such a transfer, a court might uphold the transfer in equity if the
196. See id. at 618 (stating that the debtor has an equitable obligation to restore the creditor
to the status quo).
197. Cf Howard, supra note 170, at 1065 ("Given that most bankrupts are consumer
debtors and that most of their creditors are commercial lenders, economic analysis leads to the
conclusion that discharge should be freely given.").
198. See JOHN A. BORRON, THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS § 391, at 418 (3d ed. 2002)
(defining an expectancy as the possibility that a prospective legatee or devisee might acquire
property by will upon the death of the testator).
199. See supra Part lI.A (discussing the effect of the relation-back doctrine).
200. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 395, at 426 (finding that the rationale of most courts is
that "a bare expectancy is not assignable at law because the grantor has nothing to assign");
Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The
Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1545, 1572-73 (1982)
(explaining that heirs apparent cannot legally assign or transfer expectancy interests because the
putative grantor has nothing to assign or transfer).
201. See Pher Partners v. Womble (In re Womble), 289 B.R. 836, 847 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2003) (reasoning that it would be unjust to allow a debtor to disclaim after having legally
assigned or pledged his inheritance to a third party (citing Badouh v. Hale, 22 S.W.3d 392,
396-97 (Tex. 2000))).
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creditor has given fair consideration for the expectancy or if the debtor has
granted a security interest in the property. 2
In exercising its equitable powers, a bankruptcy court cannot completely
disregard statutory dictates.0 3 Federal bankruptcy law does not treat an
expectancy interest as an interest in property for inclusion in the bankruptcy
estate unless the debtor actually accepts the property on the date of filing or
within 180 days thereafter.20 4 If a debtor has not accepted the property prior to
filing and has not attempted to assign the expectancy or grant a security interest
in it, a bankruptcy court clearly cannot apply equity to bring the property into
the bankruptcy estate.205
The Introduction to this Note asks whether the power to disclaim gives
license to the wealthy to spend extravagantly with the knowledge that creditors
will not attach their family property. Commentators pose a similar question
with respect to transfers of expectancy interests. 6 Professor Dawson explains
that restraints on alienation of expectancy interests began with the concerns of
English chancellors that "improvident sales" would lead to the dispersal of
England's landed estates.20 7 Their motive was "to preserve for a dominant class
the economic resources on which its prestige and power depended. 20 8
In light of this background, one might suggest that the power to disclaim
also represents a perverse protection for the wealthy. But modem American
courts addressing expectancy interests have not focused on preserving
202. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 396, at 431 (asserting that "[t]he transfer of an
expectancy by way of security is held just as effective as an outright assignment" (citing
Hofmeister v. Hunter, 283 N.W. 330 (Wisc. 1939))); Alexander, supra note 200, at 1573
(noting that a "contract to convey the inherited interest in the future is specifically enforceable
in equity, so long as fair and substantial consideration is given in exchange for the expectant
heir or legatee's promise to convey his interest").
203. See Womble, 289 B.R. at 849 (stating that bankruptcy courts must resist the
temptation to apply equity to disregard a disclaimer when the particular circumstances of a case
show that the disclaimer was otherwise legally valid).
204. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 396, at 432 n.2 (explaining that an expectancy, in
bankruptcy proceedings, is not an asset of the devisee unless it qualifies as a bequest, devise, or
inheritance that the bankruptcy estate may reach under I I U.S.C. § 541 (a)(5)(A)).
205. See Womble, 289 B.R. at 849 (suggesting that a court cannot apply equity to defeat a
disclaimer when the debtor's pre-disclaimer actions do not legally bring property into the
bankruptcy estate).
206. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L.
REv. 253, 267-76 (1947) (analyzing the history of courts' protection of expectant heirs in
equity).
207. See id. at 268 (describing the practice of English chancellors in the late seventeenth
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dominant economic classes, but on protecting expectant beneficiaries from
unscrupulous creditors.209 For instance, in allocating economic power between
parties in dispute, American courts have increasingly addressed the problems
that stem from inequality in bargaining power.21
Allowing creditors to reach a debtor's expectancy to receive property by
will would frustrate the efficient and equitable allocation of resources in two
major ways.21  First, as the previous paragraph suggests, it would allow
creditors to take unfair advantage of the expectant beneficiary.212 Second, it
would frustrate the testator's intended course of devolution for his property."1 3
This Note next addresses these two issues in turn.
1. Bargaining Power
Professor Dawson explains that the doctrine against transferring
expectancy interests first developed when the landed elite held the political
power, while their creditors were merely "hangers-on of polite society who
pandered to extravagance by supplying it with the necessary means.
2 14
Dawson suggests that judges who used their power to protect the wealthy rested
209. See id. at 274-76 & n.62 (discussing the rejection of the policy to prevent dissipation
of family estates in American law, but recognizing rare cases that maintained strict controls over
sales of expectancies to protect the adequacy of price); see also Klingensmith v. Klingensmith,
185 N.W. 75, 77 (Iowa 1921) (concluding that a bank received unjust enrichment when it
induced an expectant heir to quitclaim his expectancy interest in his father's estate by
representations that it was merely security for a loan rather than full consideration for the loan).
210. See Dawson, supra note 206, at 253 (noting that courts, as they have increasingly
taken a stand on control of economic power in the modem world, have confronted problems of
inequality in bargaining power).
211. Cf supra notes 179-81 & accompanying text (analyzing the law-and-economics view
that the purpose of the law is to promote the efficient allocation of resources by effectuating the
reasonable expectations of parties in conflict).
212. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 395, at 426 (observing an objection to the alienability
of expectancies on grounds that it permits creditors to take unfair advantage of a devisee
apparent, who may be inclined to "discount the future and 'sell his birthright for a mess of
pottage").
213. See id. (recognizing an objection to the alienability of expectancies on grounds that
they are unfair to the testator, who should enjoy the privilege to determine the course of his
property's devolution by will).
214. See Dawson, supra note 206, at 268 ("it was honorable to maintain a gentlemanly
extravagance, even where current income did not suffice; all blame was reserved for those
hangers-on of polite society who pandered to extravagance by supplying it with the necessary
means.").
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their judgments on inequitable and elitist grounds.' 5 But in modem day
America, creditors are no longer "hangers-on of polite society."
Today corporate creditors dominate social and political power in
America. 1 6 Credit card companies extend unsecured credit to lower and
middle class Americans with a feverish zeal that some might describe as
predatory.217 The same creditors actively lobby Congress for tighter bankruptcy
laws, using the moral argument that "debtors have a responsibility to make
good on their obligations."2 8 While the latest congressional effort to make
bankruptcy laws more favorable to creditors fell to a presidential veto,2 19 some
commentators believe that even the current bankruptcy laws, in practice, stack
the deck against consumers.220
Against this backdrop, restraints on alienation of a debtor's expectancy
interest should apply to the prepetition disclaimer context. Courts should shield
a debtor's expectancy from creditors, especially creditors that have not
bargained for a security interest in the expectancy. This conclusion is
particularly salient given that creditors are often in a position of superior
bargaining power.
215. See id. at 268 & n.37 (citing several cases that display courts' "snobbery" in
protecting expectant heirs of"ancient families" from their own merchant-fed extravagance).
216. See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Soaked By Congress: Lavished with
Campaign Cash, Lawmakers are "Reforming" Bankruptcy, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64
(discussing the extensive lobbying efforts of credit card companies and other financial services
businesses that contributed more than twenty million dollars to members of Congress during the
2000 debate on the Bankruptcy Reform Bill).
217. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 18, 108-1I, 134-40
(2000) (reporting that credit card companies vastly increased lending to middle class and even
poor Americans in the 1980s and 1990s); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized
Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 399 (1994) (attributing some of the growth in
consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1980s and 1990s to a declining economic status of the
lower middle class combined with an increased availability of credit card lending).
218. See SKEEL, supra note 181, at 191 (discussing the recurring emphasis on "credit
morality" by creditors' lobbyists during the debates on bankruptcy laws in Congress); Bartlett &
Steele, supra note 217, at 64 (describing the credit card industry's public relations campaign
during the 2000 bankruptcy reform debate that portrayed the bankruptcy system as "rife with
abuse" and in need of legislation that would make it easier to collect from debtors in
bankruptcy). But see Hirsch, supra note 64, at 610-11 (arguing that viewing debts as a moral
obligation misconstrues the arm's length nature of consensual debtor-creditor relationships).
219. See SKEEL, supra note 181, at 209-10 (reporting the factors responsible for President
Clinton's veto of the 2000 Bankruptcy Reform Bill).
220. See Whitford, supra note 217, at 415-16 (suggesting that most debtors who enter
bankruptcy are not in an optimal position to make the numerous strategic choices necessitated
by the complex Bankruptcy Code because they lack the necessary resources).
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Allowing creditors to defeat a disclaimer and reach a debtor's expectancy
interest in family property would create a loss of value to the beneficiary's
family that would be disproportionate to the gain in value to creditors.2 ' For
instance, a forced sale would likely yield less than the property's actual value2.
and would certainly yield less than the sentimental value of the property to the
beneficiary's family. Such a result would frustrate the law's goal of enforcing
deals in a way that promotes the optimal allocation of resources.
223
2. Testator Intent
Is a disclaimer a legitimate device by which a person can protect property
that has sentimental value to his family? A debtor cannot argue that defeating a
disclaimer frustrates his intention that family property will pass to his
children.224 Such an argument would lead to the conclusion that the debtor's
disclaimer amounted to an exercise of a general power of appointment
2 5
Actually, most disclaimer statutes prohibit the disclaimant from specifically
directing property to a taker of his choice.226 The rationale behind disclaimers
is that the devisee should be able to reject any devise.227 In rejecting a devise,
the debtor cannot then determine to whom the property will pass.
221. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 395, at 426-27 (noting that if creditors could reach
expectancy interests, expectant devisees might seek immediate credit that creditors could
unreasonably discount in comparison to the eventual value of the property).
222. See id. at 426-27 ("A forced sale would in all probability bring but a small fraction of
the actual value.., which the debtor expected to acquire.").
223. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (analyzing the law-and-economics
view that the purpose of the law is to promote the efficient allocation of resources by
effectuating the reasonable expectations of parties in conflict); cf SKEEL, supra note 18 1, at 201
(suggesting that the law-and-economics analysis need not always result in a conclusion that
favors creditors).
224. See Lowe v. Brajkovic (in re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402,411 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)
(rejecting the debtor's argument that defeating her disclaimer frustrated her intentions to assure
that her property would pass to her children).
225. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (identifying the holdings in Stein v. Brown,
480 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1985), and Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401 (Cal.
1940), stating that a disclaimer is closely analogous to a general power of appointment under
which a disclaimant can determine to whom the disclaimed property will pass).
226. See Bender, supra note 66, at 903 (asserting that the general power of appointment
argument fails to recognize that disclaimer statutes "specifically prohibit the disclaimant from
directing the interest to another transferee of her choice").
227. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing the right to reject a gift as a
rationale for allowing disclaimers).
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Courts should not try to effectuate the disclaimant's intent about to whom
the property should pass. But they should, in fact, try to come as close as
possible to effectuating the intent of the testator.228 A court should reasonably
infer that the testator, in the event of a beneficiary's disclaimer, would prefer
that the property pass to another member of his family. 2 9  In many
circumstances, the testator's will expressly anticipates the possibility of
disclaimer.23° Creditors reaching disclaimed assets in such situations would
directly interfere with the testator's estate plan. The testator's intent is
something that bankruptcy law should protect.
States have an interest in protecting the family devotion and estate
planning goals of testators.23' Allowing creditors to defeat a disclaimer and
reach a debtor's expectancy of receiving property by will would frustrate the
testator's intended course of devolution for his property. 232 "Instead of his
property passing to his heir or devisee as he had supposed, it would pass to a
stranger, perhaps even to some unscrupulous loan shark."233 Thus, defeating a
disclaimer would create a result that "ministers to the mercenary passions at the
expense of benevolent affections.
23 4
228. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tateo, 768 A.2d 243, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(directing that the court should focus on the testator's subjective intent based on his "dominant
plan and purpose" in light of the surrounding circumstances (citing Fid. Union Trust Co. v.
Robert, 178 A.2d 185, 187 (N.J. 1962))).
229. See id. at 246-47 (reasoning that the court, in deciding what the testator's intent
would be in changed circumstances, should presume that the testator held impulses common to
human nature). But see Bamer v. Sheldon, 678 A.2d 717, 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(refusing to find malpractice liability when a lawyer failed to propose a tax-saving disclaimer for
the testator's children because such a disclaimer would frustrate the testator's express intent to
minimize the benefits that would pass to his wife).
230. See, e.g., JEROME A. MANNING ET AL., MANNING ON ESTATE PLANNING § 2: 10, at 2-51
(5th ed. 2001 ) (noting that a testator's will should clearly provide for the disposition of property
in the event of a disclaimer).
231. See Succession of Neuhauser, 579 So. 2d 437, 442 (La. 1991) ("[T]he legitimate
motives of familial devotion and estate planning that may underlie [disclaimers] arguably should
not be threatened or frustrated, and therefore they should not be vulnerable to attack unless there
are grounds to claim that the [disclaiming] party's intent was fraudulent.").
232. See BoRRoN, supra note 198, § 395, at 426 (recognizing an objection to the
alienability of expectancies on the grounds that it would be unfair to the testator, who should
enjoy the privilege to determine the course of his property's devolution by will).
233. Id.
234. See BUMP, supra note 187, at 73 (reasoning that the law should not always give
creditors priority if that means trampling on others who have a strong beneficial or sentimental
interest in property because creditors "become creditors by their own volition and have
abundant means for their own protection").
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VI. Conclusion
Does the Supreme Court's holding in Drye v. United States extend to
disclaimers occurring within one year prior to a debtor's filing of a bankruptcy
petition? The author concludes that it does not. This conclusion rests on the
formulation of what constitutes an interest of the debtor in property pursuant to
the federal fraudulent conveyances statute, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). In states that
apply the common law doctrine of relation-back, disclaimed property is never
an interest of the debtor in property.2 35 While some courts assert that the
Bankruptcy Code preempts the relation-back doctrine,236 most post-Drye courts
distinguish the prepetition bankruptcy disclaimer situation from the tax lien
situation in Drye.23 It appears that the Supreme Court decided Drye largely on
the basis of public policy concerns about the ability of the federal government
to collect delinquent taxes, not on the basis of property law doctrine.23
While property law does not permit the bankruptcy trustee to reach
disclaimed property, some commentators advocate the application of public
policy to decide the prepetition disclaimer question. 239 From a public policy
standpoint, should Drye extend to defeat prepetition disclaimers? The author
concludes that it should not. This conclusion rests on the principles of
federalism and separation of powers, specifically that federal courts should not
preempt areas of traditional state control without clear congressional intent to
do so.2 40 Since the Bankruptcy Code and its underlying policies do not clearly
235. See Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 20-21 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
2002) (explaining that the Oklahoma relation-back doctrine prevents the bankruptcy trustee
from reaching disclaimed property under I I U.S.C. § 548(a) (2002)); Jones v. Atchison (In re
Atchison), 101 B.R. 556, 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that the Illinois relation-back
doctrine prevents the bankruptcy trustee from reaching disclaimed property under § 548).
236. See, e.g., In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246,256 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (concluding that
the bankruptcy trustee could avoid a disclaimer under I I U.S.C. § 548(a) despite the Iowa
relation-back doctrine because the disclaimer allowed the debtor to transfer the property to his
children).
237. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases on prepetition
disclaimers that limit the application of Drye to tax lien cases under 26 U.S.C. § 6321).
238. See Garrett, 281 B.R. at 20 (observing that Drye rested on authority suggesting that
the IRS has rights superior to private creditors); In re Nistler, 259 B.R. 723, 726-27 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2001 ) (same); see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court
resolved Drye on the basis of public policy concerns rather than on the theoretical grounds of
what constitutes an interest of a debtor in property).
239. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 64, at 609-10 (asserting that courts should resolve the
issue of disclaimers with reference to the public policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code rather than
on the basis of arcane property theories).
240. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (arguing that federal courts should
only create federal common law in areas where Congress has clearly shown an intent to preempt
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defeat prepetition disclaimers, federal courts should not defeat prepetition
disclaimers absent future congressional action.24'
This conclusion also rests on the relative expectations of the debtor and his
creditors. While bankruptcy disrupts creditor-debtor relations, a prepetition
disclaimer does not actually defeat any expectations of the creditor to receive
property that he has not relied upon when deciding to extend credit.
242
Creditors usually do not bargain with debtors for a security interest in their
expectancy property.243 Defeating a debtor's prepetition disclaimer would work
against the testator's wishes of keeping assets in the family rather than in the
hands of creditors. Overriding the disclaimer would also unfairly frustrate the
efficient and equitable allocation of resources by taking assets out of the family
to benefit creditors who, despite their superior bargaining power,2' " never
actually bargained for the property.
state law with federal law).
241. See Bender, supra note 66, at 909 (proposing that Congress pass legislation to
obliterate "inconsistencies arising when federal law implicates state law disclaimers").
242. See supra notes 188-91 (observing that allowing creditors to reach debtors'
disclaimed property would result in a windfall to creditors because voluntary creditors take
calculated risks when entering arm's length transactions which usually do not rest on
considerations of the debtors' expectations of receiving property by will).
243. See BORRON, supra note 198, § 396, at 431-32 (noting that a debtor may transfer an
expectancy interest by granting a security interest to a creditor).
244. See supra Part V.B.I (discussing the unequal bargaining power between most
creditors and debtors and suggesting that politically powerful corporate creditors routinely take
advantage of consumer debtors).
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